| Introduction
 This paper aims to expose current historiography as Alphacentric: 
              a history of writing that is always tied to the emergence of the 
              alphabet. We propose that any "new" history of writing 
              must also consider what constitutes writing in the first place, 
              especially in the context of non-Hellenic, non-Western traditions 
              of writing. If the definition of writing is expanded to include 
              any surviving symbolization, then the possibilities of including 
              the histories of cultures more reliant on diverse textual systems 
              suddenly become available. Historiography, then, becomes the act 
              of writing histories about symbolization in general, whether it 
              be in the form of images and icons, textiles, architecture, ceramics, 
              etc..
 
 What this paper will do is twofold: 1) We will expand the term "writing" 
              to be the production of "text" that may be discursive 
              or non-discursive: "text" is a word that has come to mean 
              any artifact of symbolization that can be "read" by an 
              audience; and 2) We will demonstrate how such an expansion of the 
              term "writing" can change historiography by reconstructing 
              cumulative histories of Mexican-Amerindian codex writing. This in 
              turn can also work against the "print dominance" found 
              in most composition classrooms while attempting to expand what is 
              considered legitimate products of composition-especially within 
              the pressures of multi-genre, multimedia views of composition.
 
 We do not intend to limit our examination of Mexican-Amerindian 
              codex writing as a mere "alternative" narrative that ensures 
              the staying power of "non-Western" traditions. Narratives, 
              Malea Powell reminds us, are more than survival and endurance; they 
              have the power to inscribe, re-inscribe, and un-inscribe our world 
              (427). Such narratives are valuable to writing specialists, especially 
              those concerned with how cultural identities in the Americas are 
              shaped, destroyed, and sustained through official, resistant, and 
              ritualistic uses of writing.
 
 The narratives we telescope here illustrate the written responses 
              to dominant historical narratives in the work of Mexican-Amerindian 
              Codices, some of the only major Aztec poetic forms to survive after 
              the transnational importation of Iberian customs. While we offer 
              a brief overview of the colonial era manuscripts produced in the 
              sixteenth century, our focus is primarily on the contemporary Codex 
              Espangliensis: From Columbus to the Border Patrol by Guillermo Gómez-Peña, 
              Enrique Chagoya, and Felicia Rice. Specifically, we argue that Mexican-Amerindian 
              codex rhetorics have continually adapted, rejected, and revised 
              dominant historical narratives of the West, that they continue to 
              do so today, and that our analysis of the Codex Espangliensis can 
              offer much to scholars in Rhetoric and Composition still searching 
              for productive ways of examining "race," rhetoric, and 
              the plurality of writing practices that thrived in America long 
              before the arrival of the Puritan colonies and the rise of Western 
              European education institutions-a task that requires an expanded 
              conception of language beyond the discursive.
 
 A Rejection of "Alphacentric" Language Theory
 
 Historiography remains both a methodological as well as a disciplinary 
              concern for contemporary scholarship. In our field, Composition 
              and Rhetoric, the difficulties and rewards of historiography come 
              in and out of vogue depending on the amount of historical scholarship 
              being published at the moment. In 1988 and 1997, the Octalogs (I 
              and II, respectively) published in Rhetoric Review testified as 
              to how divergent our discipline is concerning the way history gets 
              written. In the first Octalog, Nan Johnson, takes a position in 
              the debate by saying, simply, that she "proceed[s] on the assumption 
              that historical research and writing are archaeological and rhetorical 
              activities" (9). Similarly, Janet M. Atwill, in Octalog II, 
              proclaims how historians both conform and stretch the traditional 
              forms of historiography: "I have submitted to the conventions 
              of a patriarchal discipline, but I have tried to use those conventions 
              to raise as much hell as possible" (25). There seems to be 
              as many perspectives as there are historians, and it is this kind 
              of rich debate about historiography that keeps at the forefront 
              the important role histories (and narratives in general) maintain 
              in directing, as well as authorizing, scholarly inquiry.
 
 But as we look at the challenges and shortcomings brought on in 
              part by the changing definitions of "history," very little 
              attention is being paid to the way the changing definitions of "writing" 
              impacts historiography. Walter Ong, in his influential and troubling 
              book Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World, does 
              little to help historians of writing think broadly and across cultures 
              because he consistently reinforces a notion of writing that privileges 
              the alphabet as a precondition for "literacy":
 
 
                                
                                    | 
                                            Writing, 
                      in the strict sense of the word, the technology which has 
                      shaped and powered the intellectual activity of modern man, 
                      was a very late development in human history. Homo sapiens 
                      has been on earth perhaps some 50,000 years (Leaky and Lewin 
                      1979, pp. 141 and 168). The first script, or true writing, 
                      that we know, was developed among the Sumerians in Mesopotamia 
                      only around the year 3500 BC (Diringer 1953; Gelb 1963). 
                      . . . It is of course possible to count as 'writing' any 
                      semiotic mark, that is, any visible or sensible mark which 
                      an individual makes and assigns a meaning to. Thus a simple 
                      scratch on a rock or a notch on a stick interpretable only 
                      by the one who makes it would be 'writing'. If this is what 
                      is meant by writing, the antiquity of writing is perhaps 
                      comparable to the antiquity of speech. However, investigations 
                      of writing which take 'writing' to mean any visible or sensible 
                      mark with an assigned meaning merge writing with purely 
                      biological behavior. When does a footprint or a deposit 
                      of feces or urine (used by many species of animals for communication-Wilson 
                      1975, pp. 228-9) become 'writing'? Using the term 'writing' 
                      in this extended sense to include any semiotic marking trivializes 
                      its meaning. The critical and unique breakthrough into new 
                      worlds of knowledge was achieved within human consciousness 
                      not when simple semiotic marking was devised but when a 
                      coded system of visible marks was invented whereby a writer 
                      could determine the exact words that the reader would generate 
                      from the text. This is what we usually mean today by writing 
                      in its sharply focused sense. (84) |  We 
              quote this at length because Ong manages to state in this passage 
              the more common perspectives concerning writing, especially as it 
              is talked about in linguistic and archeological contexts. Though 
              Ong manages to make some important points in this book about the 
              connection between "literacy" and technology, this specific 
              passage rather elegantly provides a glimpse into beliefs about writing 
              that this paper most ardently refutes. From Ong, we can get a clear 
              picture of what writing is not: that for writing to be "true" 
              it must have an alphabet; writing must also must not be "interpretable 
              only by the one who makes it"; that writing conceived as "any 
              visible or sensible mark" becomes "purely biological behavior," 
              and when this happens such confusion with semiotics "trivializes 
              its meaning"; and, most damning for the history of writing, 
              Ong's passage makes it clear that in order for writing to spawn 
              the "critical and unique breakthrough into new worlds of knowledge" 
              comes only through the creation of "exact words" from 
              which a reader could "generate" the transferred thoughts 
              of the writer. In other words, Ong defines writing-"in the 
              strict sense of the word"-as a type of semiotics consistent 
              with the sender-message-receiver (or "communication triangle") 
              view of writing in which a thought is sent via a message to a receiver 
              where it can be exactly and completely translated back into the 
              original thought. We dispute this position in favor of a definition 
              of writing that comes from an expanded view of language theory-one 
              that allows for each of these elements Ong declares as outside the 
              "true" sense of the term "writing." 
 Ong's view, then, is most certainly alphacentric in that he centers 
              the very definition of writing on the precondition that it must 
              have an alphabet: an abstracted symbol system that is wholly discursive 
              in nature. In order to understand what we mean by "alphacentric" 
              histories of writing, and to grasp why Ong's view of writing leads 
              to the writing of such histories, we must first examine why the 
              communication-triangle view of language fails as a model and, specifically, 
              why language is made up of more than just discursive writing. Writing, 
              as we wish to define it here, includes the discursive "word" 
              in all of its forms, but it also includes the more non-discursive 
              image as well. Susanne Langer first defined the terms "discursive" 
              and "non-discursive" in her book Philosophy in a New Key. 
              The discursive, the form of symbolization most common to composition 
              classrooms, includes the kind of language-making in which we "string 
              out" our ideas; it relies on language to be ordered, sequential, 
              and adherent to the "laws of reasoning" often assumed 
              to be synonymous with the "laws of discursive thought" 
              (82). Discursive texts often take the form of the expository essay, 
              the oral presentation, research and argument papers, and the common 
              "modes" such as narrative and description, etc. The discursive 
              is bound by semantic forms and, consequently, limits itself by those 
              forms because it assumes that the "word" is the only means 
              to articulate thought, and that anything that cannot be directly 
              conveyed by discursive means-i.e., anything unsayable or ineffable-is 
              mere feeling, or too "fuzzy" for serious study, or merely 
              "biological," as Ong put it. The discursive, therefore, 
              is commonly referred to as "verbal" or a kind of "literacy" 
              opposed to speech. The discursive, therefore, is often what we consider 
              to be "written" communication because, like this paragraph, 
              it aims to convey one idea after another, as precisely as possible, 
              with as few transmission "errors" as possible.
 
 Conversely, the non-discursive is free of such ordering. In fact, 
              its most apparent difference from discursive symbolization is that 
              it often happens at once, is primarily reliant on image (taken here 
              to mean both sensory and mental images), and that it comes to symbolize 
              what cannot be said or written directly by the word. Here is what 
              Langer says about the non-discursive:
 
 
                                
                                    | 
                                            Visual 
                      forms-lines, colors, proportions, etc.-are just as capable 
                      of articulation, i.e., of complex combination, as words. 
                      But the laws that govern this sort of articulation are altogether 
                      different from the laws of syntax that govern language. 
                      The most radical difference is that visual forms are not 
                      discursive. They do not present their constituents successively, 
                      but simultaneously, so the relations determining a visual 
                      structure are grasped in one act of vision. Their complexity, 
                      consequently, is not limited, as the complexity of discourse 
                      is limited, by what the mind can retain from the beginning 
                      of an apperceptive act to the end of it. [. . .] An idea 
                      that contains too many minute yet closely related parts, 
                      too many relations within relations, cannot be "projected" 
                      into discursive forms; it is too subtle for speech [. . 
                      .] But the symbolism furnished by our purely sensory appreciation 
                      of forms is a non-discursive symbolism, peculiarly well 
                      suited to the expression of ideas that defy linguistic "projection" 
                      [. . . .] the forms and qualities we distinguish, remember, 
                      imagine, or recognize are symbols of entities which exceed 
                      and outlive our momentary experience. (93) |  Langer 
              frames the difference between "visual forms" and "words" 
              (her way of simplifying the difference between "non-discursive" 
              text and "discursive" text) as differing primarily through 
              "laws" that "govern" them. What Langer will 
              clarify later is that images are not just "visual forms" 
              but any form taken by the senses, and that these forms are necessarily 
              more complex, in part because they are "simultaneously" 
              received, and because it "contains too many minute yet closely 
              related parts." Non-discursive symbolization, therefore, includes 
              those "things which do not fit the grammatical scheme of expression" 
              (89). It is symbolized language, but it is a form not limited to 
              the "chain-of-reasoning" we require in discursive text. 
              Its strength, in part, is that it suddenly can handle thoughts that 
              are otherwise too complicated-unutterable, or pre-vocal even-and 
              that there are connections through images that may lead to further 
              articulation. The codices we will discuss later, for example, rely 
              as much on their extra-communicative elements as they do their direct 
              historical or contemporary references. The value of non-discursive 
              text, therefore, is that it thrives and derives meaning from the 
              complexity and ambiguity of its medium, whereas discursive language 
              works best when it reifies and reduces complexity and ambiguity 
              as it goes along. 
 The most important aspect to this distinction between discursive 
              and non-discursive text is that image becomes language "in 
              the strict sense of the word" because it is defined as language. 
              Image can even be discursive, as in the form of charts, graphs, 
              and icons in ideographs. But by allowing non-discursive elements 
              of text to be considered on par with discursive elements of text, 
              we are displacing the alphabet from the center of notions of writing. 
              The term "writing," therefore, becomes a term inclusive 
              of the rich complexity inherent to non-discursive symbolization. 
              It is no longer limited, or reduced, to simply those types of symbols 
              for which Ong would deem trivial, interpretable only by the author, 
              or even less "true" (84). In the end, one of the most 
              vital roles for images is that it embraces cultures with diverse 
              symbol systems as "literate," or, in Ong's terms, able 
              to achieve "breakthroughs" in "human consciousness." 
              This type of historiography (and view of language) is then capable 
              of accounting for both the discursive and non-discursive aspects 
              of human activity, thereby providing a view of writing responsive 
              not only to a panoply of other (non-Occidental) historical cultures, 
              but also to current trends in digital discourse-trends that call 
              for increased attention to visual, multi-genre, and multi-media 
              composition practices.
 
 In order for us to write non-alphacentric histories, therefore, 
              the first thing we must do is expand our theories of language beyond 
              its discursive bias. There have been many theories of language, 
              and many have their merits for their particular disciplinary audiences. 
              In fact, Composition and Rhetoric scholars are always necessarily 
              theorists in language, even if such a theory remains subsumed by 
              whatever emphasis or specialization is currently occupying the discussion 
              (a point that I.A. Richards originally voiced years ago).1 If we 
              are to theorize writing beyond an alphabetic system, then by necessity 
              we must also come to theorize language beyond the discursive.
 
 How does redefining our view of language to include image and the 
              non-discursive open up possibilities for historiography? The following 
              discussion attempts to answer this by proposing that inclusion of 
              images in our conceptions of language frees it from the more linear, 
              non-affective, enthymemic set of resources found in discursive text; 
              more than the one-to-one correspondence between sender to message 
              to receiver; and more than any supposition that language is primarily 
              a set of (arbitrary) linguistic sign systems useful in communicating 
              thought transparently. Once such view of language, the Shannon-Weaver 
              view, posits language within an informational paradigm useful in 
              just this kind of communication-a practical way to move a message 
              between sender and receiver. Indeed, this role for language is acceptable 
              and necessary. However, even the Shannon-Weaver theory of communication 
              eventually acknowledges the complexity that emerges from human symbol 
              systems.2 And as Langer states, "If the mind were simply a 
              recorder and transmitter, typified by the simile of the telephone-exchange, 
              we should act very differently that we do" (New Key 36). Language 
              for Langer includes all symbol systems, some of which-specifically 
              ritual, art, and dreams-are not exclusively external to the individual, 
              nor are they necessarily intended to convey the "facts of consciousness" 
              (36). It is too often the case that the communicative role of language 
              becomes the entire concept of language; that in our efforts to clarify 
              our discursive texts, we often overlook the pivotal role of the 
              non-discursive within language. In contrast, the view of language 
              proposed here necessitates and values all that language-specifically 
              image-can do: its affectivity, circularity, ambiguity, incongruity, 
              and even its ineffability.
 
 We must stress, however, that the main consequence of Langer's insistence 
              on including both discursive and non-discursive symbolization in 
              her theory of language is that it broadens the term "language" 
              itself. Language becomes all symbolization: the language of poetry, 
              math, music, textiles, food, commerce, violence, inaction, and even 
              silence. The world is text because we read the world as symbols, 
              and, in turn, create symbols to be read.3 Jacques Derrida acknowledged 
              this in Of Grammatology, and his notion of the sign continually 
              rewriting itself is consistent with the way language is viewed here: 
              what we know about the human ability to symbolize is that we must, 
              and that we do it often, and that language itself recreates itself 
              as it goes along.4 We create and produce symbols whether or not 
              we are educated or uneducated, within a community or alone, naïve 
              or wise, destitute or wealthy, sleeping or awake. Language consists 
              of more than its discursive function, more than the traditional 
              sender-messenger-receiver paradigm. Rather than consider language 
              to be primarily communication in the absence of noise, we prefer 
              to think of language as encompassing all of our powers to symbolize.
 
 Image Writing and Historiography
 
 Michael Ann Holly's book, Past Looking: Historical Imagination and 
              the Rhetoric of Image, demonstrates how historiography and image 
              writing may function to turn the hermeneutical gaze of the historian 
              inward. Like many historians in Composition and Rhetoric, she attempts 
              to negotiate what is perhaps the most pressing question in all historiography: 
              How do we write history and come to terms with both our desire for 
              truth and our acknowledgement that truth is unattainable? Holly 
              provides a possible compromise to this question near the end of 
              her book:
 
 
                                
                                    | 
                                            Narrative 
                      arises at that point in between where observer meets the 
                      observed, and if both poles must be textually conceived, 
                      as a poststructuralist agenda would have it, then at least 
                      a performative space is opened up for examining the grammar 
                      of the architectonic exchange. Each tries to tell the other 
                      its story. And when the histories seem to enliven rather 
                      than entrap and deplete the objects of the past, then both 
                      the empiricist obsession with evidence and the poststructuralist 
                      revulsion at truth claims become less pressing . . . Resistance 
                      to both closure and mastery is the key. (186) |  By 
              reconciling both the empiricists and the narrativists as legitimate 
              histories, and by calling for their layering in the production of 
              the two in historical scholarship without making any attempts at 
              mastering truth, Holly makes a methodological argument. But the 
              primary thesis of this book is not necessarily a methodological 
              one-it is a rhetorical one.
 Through the use of examples found in a range of influential texts 
              within the field of art history, Holly resurrects the subject/object 
              debate in light of the rhetoric of images: specifically, she wants 
              "to consider the ways in which the binary opposition between 
              subject and object can be regarded as perpetually unfixed, as historically 
              'on the move'" (7). She guides the reader through several very 
              clear (and well illustrated) examples of medieval, Renaissance, 
              baroque, and contemporary art histories in order to show how historians 
              are constructed rhetorically by what they study as indicated by 
              their own compositional narratives. In the case of the Renaissance, 
              for example, Holly examines the compositional style in Jacob Burckhardt's 
              The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy: An Essay (1958). By 
              comparing the rules of perspective first posed by Leon-Battista 
              Alberti in 1435 with Burckhardt's text, Holly shows how historical 
              data actually dictate to a degree how historians write: "Burckhardt's 
              history is a part of what it is looking at. Instead of being an 
              analytic of the period, his history is an analogue of a Renaissance 
              procedure. Subject and object interpenetrate. Cause and effect scramble 
              their linearity" (48). Holly repeats this claim using examples 
              from several other prominent histories in her field. She repeatedly 
              shows how "representational practices encoded in [artifacts] 
              continue to be encoded in their commentaries" (xiii).
 
 If it is true that historiographers see their histories through 
              contemporary lenses, Holly argues that the very same historiographers 
              were, to some degree, also designed to see them according to the 
              artifacts own rhetorical purpose. Holly's two major themes concerning 
              historiography are clearly developed throughout the book: "[f]irst, 
              perhaps it has never been true that historians of either art or 
              culture can easily escape the lure of casting their histories in 
              the shape of those objects they have set out to investigate," 
              and "[s]econd, it follows that the historian, as a special 
              kind of spectator, is herself or himself always already anticipated 
              or implicated in the formal logic or play of the works she or he 
              is describing. The author is never exclusively on the outside" 
              (79). In reviewing these points, any scholar about to undergo historical 
              research might take into account how they will map out the past 
              as well as consider if "centuries-old light has been illuminating 
              [their] gaze all along" (208). Not only must historiographers 
              contend with what they see, but also whether they were predestined 
              to see it a certain way in the first place. Self-reflexivity becomes 
              even more important to such histories, especially for those more 
              geographically and chronologically distant.
 
 One of the ancillary aspects of the book which was particularly 
              remarkable was Holly's characterization of the historical imagination, 
              or "the way we see and shape the world of the past" through 
              invention (9). Holly focuses not only how historians compose their 
              narratives, but also "how [the imagination] sets us (its scholars) 
              up as spectator-historians to see things in certain rhetorically 
              specific ways according to its own logic of figuration" and 
              that "we may be striving to look at its visual traces without 
              realizing that those works of art are also forever looking back 
              at us" (xiv). Just as archival work, for example, allows us 
              to "see" imaginatively some new narrative of the past, 
              the historian is also becoming part of the work studied: "The 
              historian is caught up in the lure of the gaze and has mapped herself 
              or himself onto the screen, taking on the coloration and playing 
              the part that the work on the other side has preordained" (24). 
              Invention through the imagination plays its rhetorical part on both 
              sides of the historical timeline. It is imbued with everything the 
              historian brings to the archive, and the historian, consequently, 
              becomes similarly affected by the artifacts waiting there. Holly 
              also reminds historiographers about the myth of discovery and the 
              difficulty such archeological metaphors present. Metaphors such 
              as "digging deeper" or "uncovering" belie an 
              enlightenment rhetoric bent on discovering Truth: "In purging 
              our historical consciousness of the idea of depth, of latent truths 
              lying beneath manifest clues, [we] return to the surface of interpretation 
              and linkages that lie there" (138). These archeological metaphors 
              tempt the treasure hunter inside us, betraying even further the 
              impossibility of cool objectivity.
 
 Past Looking answers the call for "transdisciplinarity" 
              of research and methodologies from other fields of study. Holly's 
              book attempts to address "a crucial problem in late twentieth-century 
              historiography: the question of 'adequacy,' or at the very least 
              'suitability,' in historical representation (7). As she illustrates 
              using Burckhardt's traditional history of the Renaissance, old methodologies 
              die hard-the lure of claiming empirical truth through history remains 
              strong. She says, "I think it is intriguing to contemplate 
              why many historians, not to say most twentieth-century thinkers 
              in general, are driven to think perspectivally, compelled to create 
              worlds in which all things fall into place. In this sense . . . 
              perspective is not liberating. It is dogmatic and doctrinaire. It 
              admits no disjunctions or contrarieties into its scheme. By contrast, 
              the medieval treatment of space could be construed as creatively 
              freeing" (50). By this description, such "perspective" 
              can be likened to the penchant for discursive text because it too 
              privileges the clear and unemotional, the scheme of sequential analogue, 
              and the unambiguous.
 
 Just as Rhetoric and Composition begins to digest new histories 
              which vacillate between traditionalist and non-traditionalist methodologies, 
              Holly's book becomes especially important. By examining the nature 
              of "the gaze," or seeing, or looking back into history, 
              Holly the art historian foregrounds epistemological and phenomenological 
              concerns with postmodern and poststructuralist theory in order to 
              emphasize how the "figural logic of the [artifact] effaces 
              the writer and puts in his or her place the logic of semantic space: 
              two narratives tattooing each other across historical distance" 
              (176). In doing so, Holly finds some middle-ground for writers interested 
              in "seeing" and "looking" into the past without 
              falling victim to the illusion of intransigence. She also opens 
              up a space for image writing to become analyzed historically without 
              necessarily being rewritten through an intra-European, alphacentrist 
              viewpoint.
 
 The Codex as Image Writing
 
 De-naturalizing this history is vital to reading codex image writing, 
              as too many in the field have biased their theories on evolutionist 
              and colonialist narratives that obscure Mesoamerican and Mestiza 
              writing as pre-literate. George Kennedy's ambitious Comparative 
              Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction, for example, 
              reconstitutes Mexican-origin peoples as cultures without writing 
              and ranks them on a great rhetorical chain of being and social order 
              midway between the animal world and Ancient Greeks. Glyphs in Oaxaca, 
              however, situate the earliest known evidence of North American writing 
              between 650-700 B.C.E. The glyphs, about 2,700 years old, would 
              not only establish early Mexicans as plausibly the first writers 
              and teachers of writing on this hemisphere, but they would also 
              locate the cultural province of México as potentially one 
              of the earliest on the planet to advance a complex inscription system. 
              These historical legacies are important, as codex writing references 
              this past while simultaneously addressing today's world. Rather 
              than attempting to preserve or re-create a Mesoamerican "authenticity," 
              Mexican-Amerindian codex writing instead generates new visions of 
              history and identity to be realized and inscribed, "from Columbus 
              to the Border Patrol."
 
 In particular, we hope these stories will add to the larger project 
              of including non-discursive symbolization into our definition of 
              writing-one that is not contingent on having a Western alphabet 
              in order to be legitimate. We want these codices to lead to what 
              Jacqueline Jones Royster cites as inventing "other ways of 
              reading" the history of writing while promoting a critical 
              intervention in the politics of composition instruction in the present 
              (3). Such hermeneutic reconstructions of our world, however, call 
              into question the dominant histories of writing that recast the 
              intellectual provinces of greater México as mere peripheries 
              in the disciplinary imaginary of Rhetoric and Composition.5 The 
              wish-horizon of Hegelian Enlightenment, still virulent in the field, 
              proscribes a single road for progress, imagining the story of writing 
              and writing instruction advancing East to West. The field's largely 
              unquestioned global trajectory initiates in Ancient Greece, then 
              Rome, then Western Europe, until finally growing mature in America 
              but only in the North and not until the 19th century, during a critical 
              stage of EuroAmerican nation-building.6
 
 The stories we offer are an invitation to examine how codex image 
              writing has continually created "new" literacies: new 
              ways of speaking, writing, and reading that promote anti-colonial 
              translations of history and memory in the Americas. Our method will 
              be to read codex technologies as rhetorical texts: places and performances 
              of meaning-making which provide arguments for and against certain 
              things, namely, the dominant historical narratives of what José 
              David Saldívar in Border Matters calls the "transfrontera 
              contact zone," spaces of colonial encounters imposed by global 
              capitalism across the México/United States borderlands.
 
 Mexican-Amerindian image writing is thus a distinct enunciation, 
              grounded in the lived experiences of the peripheral colonial world. 
              These expressions illustrate new potentials that surpass the limits 
              of post-Enlightenment rationality-yet these are not projects of 
              deconstructionists or postmodernists, as such critics continue to 
              center European modernity as their organizing horizon. Instead, 
              these "subalternized" representations posit new articulations 
              of our time that provide not only much-needed correctives to historiography, 
              but political expressions better suited to current material realities 
              for both the "Global North" and "Globalized South." 
              In place of the uni-linear developmental "Composing East-to-West" 
              wish-horizon, Mexican-Amerindian codices invoke the idea of Argentinian 
              philosopher Enrique Dussel's transmodernity: a hermeneutic reconstruction 
              of temporal and spatial correlations across the globe, in which 
              it becomes possible to perceive multiple histories and memories 
              coexisting, without assumptions that all civilizations follow a 
              single Occidental, alphacentric trajectory. The following analysis 
              addresses how the reproduction of codex technology is displacing 
              the global design of the Civilizing Mission. Particularly, we focus 
              on the Civilizing Mission's consequent oppositions of "civilization/barbarism," 
              "literate/illiterate," "first world/third world," 
              "developed/underdeveloped," and "Indianism/Hispanophobia" 
              across the transfrontera contact zone. The emerging language processes 
              in texts such as the Codex Espangliensis not only displace Western 
              oppositions but also allow for possibilities beyond such dichotomous 
              reasoning.
 
 Codex Rhetorics of Resistance
 
 Through the denial of Western historical centrality, "subalternized" 
              Mexican-Amerindian subjects transcend binaries such as "First 
              world/Third world," "Developed/Underdeveloped," and 
              "Mesoamerica/later America" by engaging both yet neither 
              at the same time. Mexican-Amerindian writing practices have continually 
              adapted to new ways of social life while at the same time retaining 
              roots in older pre-Columbian communicative forms. The Amerindian 
              codices, then, are discursive manifestations of continuity and adaptation 
              that comprise this survival. Further, codex technologies offer powerful 
              critiques of the dominant historical narratives of Western expansion, 
              colony, and the border in an age when such things are hotly contested.
 
 Historically, the rhetorical work of Mexican-Amerindian pictography 
              was one of the only major Aztec poetic forms to survive the brutal 
              campaign of the Western alphabet. The codex "books" were 
              productions of paper, hide, or woven cloth; marked on one or both 
              sides and folded, rolled or left flat; and sometimes protected with 
              wooden end-pieces. The Náhua provide one of the earliest 
              Mesoamerican expressions for writing: tlacuilolitzli, which means 
              both "to write" and "to paint." While the tlacuiloque 
              composed the books' images, it was the tlamatinime who assumed ownership 
              as well as the task of textual interpretation.7 Traditionally, the 
              codices were tools of the Mexican intelligentsia to record genealogies, 
              migrations, other political affairs, and origin myths. Of the pre-Hispanic 
              era, only twenty-two codices survive, along with fifty-four commissioned 
              immediately after the conquest of Tenochtitlán in 1521.
 
 Spanish colonial powers, in the interest of reconstructing Amerindian 
              memory and history, commissioned new productions. The Codex Mendoza, 
              for example, was written in 1542 by the order of Virrey Mendoza 
              and recounts the history of the fall of México-Tenochtitlán. 
              Such colonial-era books, although penned by Mestiza and Indigenous 
              writers, initially provided the dominant narratives of Aztec history 
              as seen and authorized by Spanish imperial eyes; juxtaposed images 
              of Aztec pictography, the Spanish-Iberian alphabet, and an alphabetized 
              Náhuatl weave a narrative of the imposed transformation of 
              Indigenous writing practices and cultures. The codex was thus becoming 
              a technology of psychological violence, a tool to colonize Amerindian 
              memory.
 
 Of particular interest to writing specialists is the illustration 
              of coexisting and conflicting inscription systems in a single text. 
              Pictographs juxtaposed with Náhuatl and Castilian reflect 
              competing rationalities and histories; a palimpsest of divergent 
              traditions and ideologies where a Tlaquilo Cosmos and Ibero-Christian 
              world converge. More than hybrid expressions of cultural dichotomies, 
              the codices are fractured enunciations in response to colonial relations 
              of power that disfigure the Amerindian literate world as a "barbarian" 
              exterior to a "civilized" Occidental center. These textual 
              admixtures work to destabilize the idea of the Western letter as 
              a naturalized and valorized element of written communication while 
              calling into question the integrity of Western distinctions between 
              "orality," "writing," "image," and 
              "painting": in other words, the term "writing" 
              must embrace both discursive and non-discursive language forms if 
              we are to legitimate and create histories for these codices.
 
 During the first three generations after Cortez' invasion of México, 
              pictographic image writing remained strong between both Indigenous 
              and Mestiza writers, yet Western scholarship has traditionally focused 
              on the subjugation and erasure of Aztec agency during the colonial 
              sixteenth century. Contemporary re-readings from Cora Lagos and 
              Elizabeth Hill Boone, however, seek new translations by emphasizing 
              the power and validity of pictographic writing independent of and 
              separate from the accompanying alphabet script. We must begin to 
              "read" the pictorial image, Lagos argues, as the nexus, 
              the common space where information is established and authenticated; 
              "it is in the image more than in the writing where the contact 
              between cultures is performed" (86).
 
 From this framework, we can cultivate an understanding of a present-day 
              codex emergence, the 2000 Codex Espangliensis: From Columbus to 
              the Border Patrol, perhaps the most revisionist codex ever assembled, 
              and one that directly addresses current forms of dominant Western 
              historical narratives. Here, the authors tell a story of civilizing 
              missions, colonial conquests, and rhetorical heterogeneity using 
              poetic Spanglish, Chiconics, Aztec pictography, 20th century Mexican 
              iconography, and transnational corporate imagery to weave yet another 
              retelling of history. This time, in 1492 Noctli Europzin Tezpoca, 
              an Aztec sailor, departs from the port of Minatitlan aboard a small 
              flotilla. Eventually, Tezpoca discovers a new continent, and proceeds 
              to name it "Europzin" after himself. In November 1512, 
              Aztec soldiers begin their conquest of Europzin in the name of the 
              "Lord of Cross-Cultural Misunderstanding." The reversal 
              of Europe and Amerindia in the Codex Espangliensis's telling of 
              world history works to dislodge the integrity of the Civilizing 
              Mission as it has operated in the past and is still understood today.
 
 The alphabetic script in Codex Espangliensis intersects various 
              texts from performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña, 
              whose publications combine cyberculture and Chicano/Latino art. 
              Numerous panels of the codex include references to his 1996 The 
              New World Border, "a kind of post-Mexican literary hypertext" 
              (ii). Throughout Border and Codex Espangliensis, Gómez-Peña 
              references the collapse of "three-worlds" theory, the 
              post-1955 Bandung Conference mapping of global social space. The 
              breakdown of the opposition between First and Second worlds, with 
              the disintegration of the Soviet Union, makes it possible to imagine 
              beyond the production of the Third World and to define post-national 
              modes of collective identity in the transfrontera contact zone. 
              From New World Border, Gómez-Peña argues that the 
              "old colonial hierarchy of First World/Third World" is 
              being supplanted by "the more pertinent notion of the Fourth 
              World," explained as the "conceptual place where the indigenous 
              inhabitants of the Americas meet with the deterritorialized peoples, 
              the immigrants, and the exiles" (7). Readers of the codex are 
              confronted with transnational flows of cultures and persons in the 
              "Fourth World," spaces where the binary between Indigenous 
              "noble savages" and Mestiza "ignoble savages" 
              is undermined.
 
 Fourth World multiple temporalities furthermore compel the reader 
              to reside in the early 21st century era of late global capitalism 
              while simultaneously inhabiting the Spanish colonial sixteenth century. 
              We are thus confronted with an invitation to "read backward," 
              to consider both pre-Columbian and colonial forms of prenational 
              territorialization as well as forward to think about newly emerging 
              frontiers and regional logics that revise dominant historical narratives. 
              Transnational corporate imagery of the North American Free Trade 
              Agreement (NAFTA), Disney, and telecommunications reside along savage 
              depictions of "barbarian" Mexicans, Mestiza/os, and First 
              Nation's Peoples. On one panel, cannibal Aztecs are seen distributing 
              body parts of Disney's principle animated character, Mickey Mouse, 
              thereby critiquing both Civilization/Barbarianism and Development/Modernization 
              under the banner of global colonialism across the México/United 
              States transfrontera contact zone.
 
 For years after the United States Congress passed NAFTA in 1993, 
              debates about the treaty provoked rhetorics of border crossing and 
              crisis. Legacies of these debates form a thread of images throughout 
              Codex Espangliensis with blurred distinctions between "free 
              trade art" and "free art." Thomas Foster, in "Cyber-Aztecs 
              and Cholo-Punks," suggests that NAFTA represents both a misfortune 
              and a new opportunity
 
 
                                
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                                            to 
                      the extent that transculture and border crossing could be 
                      domesticated as "conservative diplomacy," it also 
                      proved that the idea could be reappropriated for less conservative 
                      purposes. But that reappropriation could only be accomplished 
                      through the admission that the border is no one's exclusive 
                      property or territory, neither NAFTA's nor Gómez-Peña's. 
                      (48-9) |  The 
              rhetorical work of Codex Espangliensis therefore highlights the 
              futility of clearly distinguishing between assimilationalist transcultural 
              forms and resistant ones. On one hand, the rhetoric of border crossing 
              can be a subversive and critical act. On the other, such articulations 
              can be exploitive, whether emerging from the political right or 
              the left.8
 In The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha writes of "the danger 
              that the mimetic contents of a discourse will conceal the fact that 
              the hegemonic structures of power are maintained in a position of 
              authority through a 'shift in vocabulary'" (241-2). The Codex 
              warns of such a shift in diction from geographical colonialism to 
              cultural imperialism, from Cortez to Free Trade, from "Columbus 
              to the Border Patrol," a shift that maintains power structures 
              through a veiled rhetoric of popular culture and advertising. Critically 
              reading such colonial power provokes what Clair Fox identifies as 
              a "global border consciousness," a strategic departure 
              from the site-specific concept of the México/United States 
              borderlands. Gómez-Peña mirrors such a shift to globalize 
              the border when he acknowledges: "the border is no longer located 
              at any fixed geopolitical site. I carry the border with me, and 
              I find new borders wherever I go" (New World Border 5).
 
 Also in this fractured narrative, "illustration/annotation" 
              merge in dialogic negotiation between dissonant literacies and divergent 
              reading practices. Here, new modes of Mexican-Amerindian rhetorical 
              historiography imply new ways to interpret history, rhetoric and 
              composition, thereby having substantial implications for both historians 
              and writing students. When in history did "America" become 
              literate, literary, and rhetorical? When did "writing" 
              begin in North America? According to whose measuring stick? What 
              counts as writing and what does it mean to be "literate?" 
              What does it mean to be "civilized?" In the context of 
              these crucial questions, historians of writing might read codex 
              technology as a "new" vantage point to rethink the relationship 
              between supposedly expanding notions of literacy, composition, rhetoric 
              and Mexican-Amerindian image writing. The codices evidence precisely 
              what the dominant historical imaginary erases and what the field 
              of Rhetoric and Composition lacks: co-evolutionary or parallel histories 
              of writing, rhetoric, and rational thought in the Americas.
 
 Rethinking rhetoric and writing from Mexican-Amerindian textual 
              legacies advances a more constructive understanding of parallel 
              writing systems and rationalities in America, yet such thinking 
              also promotes a critical intervention in the politics of writing 
              instruction in the present. Such an intervention might involve departing 
              from the colonial matrix and denouncing dominant alphacentric narratives 
              of writing-or perhaps facing the reality that writing specialists 
              today may need to look far beyond the myths of a Greco-Roman horizon 
              toward its challenges and mutations on a global scale. In this sense, 
              any consideration of Mexican-Amerindian subalterns as active and 
              central historical agents in the planetary narrative of the historiography 
              of writing motivates a decided departure from the field's hermeneutical 
              gaze.
 
 Works Cited
 
 Bernal, Martin. Black Athena: Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. 
              2 vols. New Brunswick: NJ: Rutgers UP, 1987.
 
 Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 1994.
 
 Boone Hill, Elizabeth. Stories in Red and Black: Pictorial Histories 
              of the Aztecs and Mixtecs. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000.
 
 ---. "Introduction: Writing and Recorded Knowledge.' Writing 
              Without Words: Alternative Literacies in Mesoamerica and the Andes. 
              Ed. Elizabeth Boone Hill and Walter Mignolo. Durham: Duke University 
              Press, 1994. 3-26.
 
 Dussel, Enrique. "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism: The 
              Semantic Slippage of the Concept of Europe." Nepantla: Views 
              from South 1.3 (2000): 465-78.
 
 Foster, Thomas. "Cyber-Aztecs and Cholo-Punks: Guillermo Gómez-Peña's 
              Five Worlds Theory." PMLA 117.1 (2002): 43-67.
 
 Fox, Clair. "The Portable Border: Site-Specifity, Art, and 
              the U.s.-Mexico Frontier." Social Text 12.4 (1994): 61-82.
 
 Gómez-Peña, Guillermo, Enrique Chagoya, and Felicia 
              Rice. Codex Espangliensis: From Columbus to the Border Patrol. San 
              Francisco: City Lights Books, 2000.
 
 Gómez-Peña, Guillermo. The New World Border. San Francisco: 
              City Lights, 1996.
 
 Holly, Michael Ann. Past Looking: Historical Imagination and the 
              Rhetoric of the Image. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1996.
 
 Kennedy, George. Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural 
              Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
 
 Lagos, Cora. "Confronting Imaginations: Towards an Alternative 
              Reading of the Codex Mendoza." Colonialism Past and Present: 
              Reading and Writing about Colonial Latin America Today. Alvaro Bolaños 
              and Gustavo Verdesio, Eds. Albany: State University of New York 
              Press, 2002. 79-95.
 
 Langer, Susan K. Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism 
              of Reason, Rite, and Art. 3rd edition. Cambridge: Harvard University 
              Press. 1942, 1951, 1957.
 
 ---. Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art. New York: Charles Scribner's 
              Sons, 1953.
 
 León-Portilla, Miguel and Earl Shorris, ed. In the Language 
              of Kings: An Anthology of Mesoamerican Literature, Pre-Columbian 
              to the Present. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2001.
 
 Mignolo, Walter. "Globalization, Civilization Processes, and 
              the Relocation of Languages and Cultures." Cultures of Globalization. 
              Eds. Frederick Jameson and Masao Miyoshi. Durham: Duke University 
              Press, 1998. 32-53.
 
 ---. Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, 
              and Border Thinking. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
 
 "Octalog: The Politics of Historiography." Rhetoric Review 
              7.1 (Fall 1988): 5-49.
 
 "Octalog II: The (Continuing) Politics of Historiography." 
              Rhetoric Review 16.1 (Fall 1997): 22-44.
 
 Ong, Walter. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. 
              London: Methuen, 1982.
 
 Powell, Malea. "Rhetorics of Survivance: How American Indians 
              Use Writing." College Composition and Communication 53.3 (February 
              2002): 396-434.
 
 Richards, I.A., Speculative Instruments. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
              1955.
 
 Royster, Jacqueline Jones. Traces of a Stream: Literacy and Social 
              Change among African American Women. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
              Press, 2000.
 
 Saldívar, José David. Border Matters: Remapping American 
              Cultural Studies. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
 
 Schiappa, Edward. "Toward an Understanding of Sophistic Theories 
              of Rhetoric." Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy 
              and Rhetoric. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991. 
              64-81.
 
 Notes
 
 1 Speculative Instruments by I.A. Richards (New York: Hartcort, 
              1955), pp. 115-116.
 
 2 See The Mathematical Theory of Communication by Claude Shannon 
              and Warren Weaver (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1949).
 
 3 This claim is one of the main tenets in cultural studies, and 
              it has become a cornerstone of postmodern studies. It is perhaps 
              the case that my view of "text" is much broader, however, 
              than even this. "Text" is not just discursive; text is 
              also non-discursive. Therefore, text can not only be a photograph 
              of a puppy; text can also be the images and feelings read in an 
              abstract expressionist painting of a puppy as well.
 
 4 "In all senses of the word, writing thus comprehends language. 
              Not that the word 'writing' has ceased to designate the signifier 
              of the signifier, but it appears, strange as it may seem, that 'signifier 
              of the signifier' no longer defines accidental doubling and fallen 
              secondarity. 'Signifier of the signifier' describes on the contrary 
              the movement of language: in its origin, to be sure, but one can 
              already suspect that an origin whose structure can be expressed 
              as 'signifier of the signifier' conceals and erases itself in its 
              own production" (7).
 
 5 And here we are confronted with the epistemological double bind 
              of any so-called "alternative" rhetoric. Either Amerindian 
              rhetorics are so different from Greco-Roman ones that they cannot 
              be considered Rhetoric proper, or conversely, to be accepted, Amerindian 
              rhetorics have to become similar and assimilated to Western conceptualizations 
              of Rhetorical practices. Rhetoric, then, has become a trademark 
              of the Western world and a yardstick by which to measure the discursive 
              products and effects of other societies. While Rhetoric now belongs 
              to the West, "alternative" rhetorics are something that 
              other societies might have as "objects" to be studied 
              by those who imagine themselves as intellectual decedents of those 
              who invented the idea of Rhetoric as well as those who invented 
              the academic field of Rhetoric and Composition. In either case, 
              provincial Western categories predetermine and fossilize the terms 
              of debate. This paper offers no quick resolution, but instead seeks 
              to question how canonical articulations of Rhetoric and Writing 
              constitute a preferable alternative to those emerging from its peripheries.
 
 6 The groundbreaking thesis of Martin Bernal's controversial Black 
              Athena reveals the cradle of the Rhetorical tradition as a conceptual 
              byproduct of early 19th century Aryan-Germanic racism that made 
              it rationally and emotionally intolerable that Greece would have 
              received its higher culture from Africans and "Semites." 
              The prevailing Aryan Model of history, to use Ed Schiappa's vocabulary, 
              is itself a "reconstruction," a fabrication premised upon 
              the irrational cornerstone of the Western European Enlightenment. 
              In "Europe, Modernity, and Eurocentrism: The Semantic Slippage 
              of the Concept of Europe," Enrique Dussel understands the uni-linear 
              diachrony Greece>Rome>Europe as an extension of the Aryan 
              Model. This fiction navigates across the Atlantic to the Americas, 
              forming yet another continental East-West progression via Manifest 
              Destiny.
  7 
              Tlamatinime are described as philosophers, women and men who studied 
              "proper discourse" (León-Portilla 73) at the conservatory 
              called the Calmécac.
 8 In Border Matters, José David Saldívar argues that 
              theoretical abstractions such as "subaltern" "Fourth 
              World," and border crossing result in a shift to dematerialize 
              the actual geography and materiality of border (158). The problem 
              with such rhetoric, Saldívar warns, stems from cutting off 
              the trope of the border from its lived experience and therefore 
              reproduces a detached logic of exaggeration and stereotyping.
 
 
                                
 
                                
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